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NOT SUPRISINGLY, A CRUCIFIX CONVEYS A 
RELIGIOUS MESSAGE 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his Article, The Story of the Gary, Indiana Crucifix, Professor Jarvis 
provides the interesting historical background to the decision in Gonzales 
v. North Township of Lake County, Indiana.1  Professor Jarvis explains not 
only the steps leading to the dedication of at least two crucifixes in 
Northwest Indiana, but also describes the people involved in the early 
opposition to the crucifixes.2  I was asked to provide a brief description 
of the litigation that led to the removal of one of the crucifixes from its 
prominent place in a public park, Wicker Memorial Park, located in 
North Township, Lake County, Indiana, near the City of Hammond.  
When I first learned of the crucifix in Wicker Park, through my 
participation in the legal panel of the Calumet Chapter of the Indiana 
Civil Liberties Union (“ICLU”), it seemed apparent that this display 
represented an endorsement of Christianity and, more particularly, 
Catholicism.  However, it turned out that it was not so apparent to others 
and, in light of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
since 1993, a similar display challenged today might survive a First 
Amendment challenge. 
II.  BACKGROUND TO THE LITIGATION 
As noted by Professor Jarvis, the ICLU, particularly the Calumet 
Chapter in Northwest Indiana, became involved in the crucifix 
controversy shortly after a crucifix was erected and dedicated in Jordan 
Park in Gary, Indiana, in late May 1955.3  The Wicker Park crucifix was 
erected and dedicated a few months later, in October 1955.4  It appears 
from Professor Jarvis’ account that the early opposition, at least in part, 
was led by members of the clergy who expressed their opposition to 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School.  
1 See Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., 4 F.3d 1412, 1414 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving a 
lawsuit against North Township in Lake County, Indiana alleging the display of a crucifix 
in a public park violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).  See generally 
Robert M. Jarvis, The Story of the Gary, Indiana Crucifix, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 873, 880–81 
(recounting how the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic Affairs Committee of Lake 
County Fourth Degree Assembly decided to support a project for erecting large crucifixes 
throughout Lake County to memorialize veterans of the country’s wars). 
2 Jarvis, supra note 1, at 889–92. 
3 Id. at 881–83. 
4 See Gonzalez, 4 F.3d at 1413 (noting that the second cross was dedicated on October 16, 
1955). 
Bodensteiner: Not Surprisingly, a Crucifix Conveys a Religious Message
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
898 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
North Township officials.5  After the early opposition and dismissal of a 
lawsuit filed in the Lake County Circuit Court, there was a lull in the 
opposition.6  The primary impetus for the renewed opposition, which led 
to the Gonzales case, was Mel Schlesinger, a local realtor.7  He raised the 
issue with the Calumet Chapter of the ICLU in August 1981.8  The action 
began with a letter to Township officials in October 1982 and concluded 
with the removal of the crucifix in 1994.9  Mr. Schlesinger, along with 
four other residents of the area who joined him, had the courage to 
initiate what they knew would be unpopular litigation.10 
III.  THE LENGTHY LITIGATION 
The complaint filed by the plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana was based on the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and alleged that “[b]y maintaining a religious 
symbol of the Catholic Church in the Park at public expense, the 
Defendants have caused injury to the Plaintiffs by infringing their use 
and enjoyment of Wicker Memorial Park and offending their moral and 
religious sensitivity.”11  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 
determining that the crucifix in the park “violates the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution . . . [,] a permanent injunction enjoining the 
Defendants from maintaining the [crucifix] in the Park, and requiring the 
Defendants to remove it . . . [,] and . . . [an] award [for] damages, costs, 
and attorney fees.”12  Aside from the merits, the defendants raised a 
statute of limitations defense and further claimed, as is common in 
Establishment Clause litigation, that the plaintiffs lacked standing.13  The 
trial court decided that the claim was not barred by the statute of 
limitations because the plaintiffs alleged “a continuing violation of the 
First Amendment, and as each day there is a violation, each day [their] 
cause of action accrues.”14 
                                                 
5 Jarvis, supra note 1, at 885–86. 
6 See id. at 892–93 (“On March 8, 1963, Judge Felix A. Kaul dismissed Tomsich’s case for 
lack of record activity.”). 
7 Id. at 893. 
8 Id. at 894. 
9 Id. at 894–95. 
10 Id. at 894. 
11 See Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., 800 F. Supp. 676, 679 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (quoting 
Pl.’s Complaint, at ¶ 8). 
12 See id.  Throughout the opinion, the court refers to the crucifix as a “Monument,” 
which is consistent with its ultimate conclusion.  However, I will call it a crucifix. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 684. 
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Addressing the standing issue, the trial court determined that the 
plaintiffs “do not have standing as taxpayers, as Township funds were 
not used to put up the Monument, nor are Township funds used to 
maintain the Monument, albeit that funds are used to maintain the area 
surrounding the Monument.”15  However, since plaintiff Appleman 
“curtailed his use of a public benefit [and] the use of the Park,” due to 
the presence of the crucifix, he had standing.16  The court determined 
that the other four plaintiffs lacked standing because they only alleged 
that they were morally and religiously offended by the display of the 
crucifix.17 
On the merits, the trial court applied the three-part Lemon test.18  
First, it concluded the crucifix has a secular purpose—“it is a war 
memorial to those who have defended our Country.”19  While conceding 
that the crucifix has religious connotations, the court determined that the 
“secular attributes far outweigh[ed] any religious connotations based on 
the facts surrounding its dedication.”20  In addressing the second part of 
the Lemon analysis, the court found that the crucifix did “not advance or 
inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect or otherwise endorse or 
disapprove of religion,” since the crucifix “was erected by the Knights of 
Columbus, and it [was] not maintained by the Township.”21  Therefore, 
the trial court noted that “the average citizen would not believe that the 
Township’s aim was to advance or endorse Christianity or Catholicism 
in particular.”22  Further, the court noted that the crucifix “occupie[d] a 
minutial amount of the Park, [was] surrounded by secular activities and 
opportunities at the Park, and [was] part and parcel of a Memorial 
Park.”23  In addition, the crucifix was located several miles from the 
offices of the North Township Trustee.24  Finally, in its application of 
Lemon, the trial court determined that the crucifix did “not foster an 
                                                 
15 Id. at 683. 
16 Id. at 684. 
17 Gonzales, 800 F. Supp. at 683. 
18 See id. at 685 (“In deciding these types of cases, the Supreme Court has utilized the 
Lemon v. Kurtzman test to determine whether a government practice violates the 
Establishment Clause.”); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) 
(establishing a three prong test).  The three prongs are:  (1) whether the statute has a secular 
legislative purpose; (2) whether the primary effect “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; 
and (3) it “must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id.  
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 




23 Id. at 689–90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 See id. at 690 (taking judicial notice of the addresses of two Trustee offices). 
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excessive entanglement with religion” because after the crucifix was 
erected the Township “had little to do with its maintenance or with 
activities in connection with the Monument as a war memorial.”25  The 
mere presence of the crucifix on Township property, far removed from 
the seat of government, could not “constitute excessive entanglement 
without any type of affirmative action taken by the Township.”26  Based 
on its application of Lemon, the court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial 
summary judgment.27 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the case 
very differently than the trial court.  First, the court held that all five 
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the crucifix, even though it agreed 
that the plaintiffs could not claim standing by virtue of their taxpayer 
status because of their inability to show that tax revenue was spent for 
the crucifix.28  The Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court’s 
finding that Appleman had standing because “for all intents and 
purposes, [he] discontinued his use of the Park.”29  In addition, the Court 
of Appeals held that the other four plaintiffs had standing to challenge 
the crucifix because, while they had not completely discontinued their 
use of the park, “[t]heir claim that they avoid the area of the park where 
the crucifix is displayed because of its presence constitutes an injury in 
fact” sufficient to confer standing.30  “[T]heir full use and enjoyment of 
the Park has been curtailed because of the defendants’ display of the 
crucifix” and that “prohibition to their full use and enjoyment of the 
public park is an injury in fact.”31 
Turning to the merits of the Establishment Clause claim, the court 
determined that, while controversial among its members, “the Supreme 
Court recently reminded us that Lemon is controlling precedent and 
should be the framework used by courts when reviewing Establishment 
Clause challenges.”32  Before addressing the three-part Lemon test, the 
court indicated that it had to “determine whether the challenged symbol 
is a religious one.”33  In concluding that the crucifix is a religious symbol, 
                                                 
25 Gonzales, 800 F. Supp. at 690. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th Cir. 1993).  The court also 
noted that the plaintiffs’ alleged “[o]ffense to moral and religious sensitivities does not 
constitute an injury in fact and is insufficient to confer standing.”  Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1417. 
32 Id. at 1417–18 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 395 (1993)). 
33 Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1418. 
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the court stated “we are masters of the obvious, and we know that the 
crucifix is a Christian symbol . . . .  In fact, the crucifix is arguably the 
quintessential Christian symbol because it depicts Christ’s death on the 
cross and recalls thoughts of his passion and death.”34 
The appellate court then moved to its application of the three-part 
Lemon test.  The court found guidance in two earlier decisions, one in the 
Eleventh Circuit and another in a Texas district court.35  The first prong 
of the Lemon analysis requires a secular purpose for government’s 
display of a religious symbol.36  While the Township claimed that the 
crucifix was intended to act as a war memorial, this was an attempt to 
mask the real religious purpose.37  The court stated that it would defer to 
government’s “sincere articulation of a religious symbol’s secular 
purpose,” but it also indicated that “the stated purpose cannot be a sham 
to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.”38  Finding the 
reasoning in Rabun and Eckels more persuasive than the reasoning in 
other cases, the court stated: 
In this case the purpose behind the display of the Wicker 
Park crucifix arises from religious stirrings like those the 
Eleventh Circuit found in Rabun.  The record illustrates 
that the Knights’ goal was to spread the Christian 
message throughout Lake County, Indiana.  The 
historical documents, as well as the nature of the 
monument, convey the unassailable impression that 
memorializing the crucifix was simply a means to this 
end.  The Township’s claim that the war memorial 
purpose is the primary reason the crucifix is displayed is 
unpersuasive.  We can imagine no secular purpose 
served by a crucifix that is free from any designation or 
memorialization.  Moreover, the Township has offered 
no evidence to show that the crucifix has ever been used 
                                                 
34 Id.  The court noted that it had reached a similar conclusion about a Latin cross in an 
earlier case, “acknowledging that it is an unmistakable symbol of Christianity as practiced 
in this country today.”  Id. (citing Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1403 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
35 See ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d 1098, 1101–02, 1111 
(11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that a Latin cross erected and maintained in the Black Rock 
Mountain State Park by the Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, with initial approval 
from the State of Georgia, violates the Establishment Clause);  Greater Houston Chapter of 
ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222, 241 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (addressing three Latin crosses 
placed in a public park with the authorization and assistance of a county commissioner and 
concluding that the crosses violate the Establishment Clause). 
36 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
37 Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1419. 
38 Id. 
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for memorial purposes.  We believe the evidence 
contradicts the Township’s statement of purpose and 
that, indeed, the religious symbol here was not intended 
to, and does not now, serve a secular purpose.39 
Because Lemon requires that the government satisfy all three prongs, this 
determination alone was sufficient to find a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Nevertheless, the court addressed the other two 
prongs of the Lemon analysis. 
To pass constitutional muster under the Lemon analysis, the publicly-
displayed religious symbol must “neither advance nor inhibit religion in 
its principal or primary effect.”40  Here the key is the message conveyed 
by a religious symbol and if “the message is a government endorsement 
or advancement of religion the symbol has failed the Lemon test.”41  
Before the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzales, the Supreme Court had 
determined that the context in which the religious symbol is displayed is 
crucial, because the context may affect the message.42  When the Seventh 
Circuit issued its opinion, the crucifix had been standing in Wicker Park 
for nearly forty years and while “the Township [did] not argue that the 
duration of its display gives the crucifix landmark or cultural status, it 
[did] argue that the duration of its display reinforces its secular effect.”43  
The court was not impressed by the argument that the duration of the 
violation of the Establishment Clause somehow minimizes the 
violation.44  Instead, the court concluded that “the crucifix’s presence in 
                                                 
39 See id. at 1419–21 (applying the Rabun facts and holding to the Wicker Park crucifix); 
see also Carpenter v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 803 F. Supp. 337, 351–52 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing 
to permanently enjoin a display of Mount Davidson Cross); Jewish War Veterans of U.S. v. 
United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 14–15 (D.D.C. 1988) (ruling that a cross is unconstitutional in 
a government memorial).  But see Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 
338, 349 (Or. 1976) (holding that a cross in a municipal park is constitutional because the 
present purpose of the display is secular). 
40 Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1418. 
41 Id. at 1421. 
42 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 666 (1989) 
(discussing religious displays during Christmas season).  In Allegheny, the Court held that a 
crèche displayed in the main area of the county courthouse, without any secular 
decorations, and donated by a religious society violates the Establishment Clause.  Id.  at 
573–74.  Another religious symbol at issue in Allegheny, a “menorah placed just outside the 
City-County Building, next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty” did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 578; see also, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) 
(discussing the crucial obligation for governments not to endorse religion).  In Lynch, the 
Court held that display of a government-owned crèche in a setting that included secular 
holiday decorations does not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 687. 
43 Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1422. 
44 Id. 
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the Park conveys the primary message of the Township’s endorsement of 
Christianity.”45  The court summarized its finding as follows:   
Not only do we believe that the primary message the 
crucifix conveys is a government endorsement of 
religion, we believe that the crucifix does not convey any 
secular message, whether remote, indirect, or incidental.  
The only way to receive a secular message before 1983 
was to look behind the shrubbery at the base of the 
crucifix to find the plaque that designated the statue is a 
war memorial.  Since the plaque’s disappearance there is 
no chance that anyone without special knowledge of the 
crucifix’s history would know that it was purportedly 
intended to memorialize fallen soldiers. 
 
The crucifix in Wicker Park does not bear secular 
trappings sufficient to neutralize its religious message.  
It is not seasonally displayed in conjunction with other 
holiday symbols.  It does not have historical significance.  
But, it is permanent government speech in a prominent 
public area that endorses religion, and violates the 
Establishment Clause.46 
Thus, the crucifix in Wicker Park failed the first two prongs of the Lemon 
analysis. 
Finally, the court looked at the excessive entanglement prong of the 
Lemon test.47  “Because the record did not reflect any contact between the 
Township and the Knights concerning the design of the crucifix or its 
payment, [the court found] that the Township [was] not excessively 
entangled in religion by virtue of the crucifix standing in Wicker Park.”48  
After the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court to 
address the appropriate relief, the parties resolved the matter.49  As 
indicated by Professor Jarvis, the crucifix was moved from Wicker Park 
to a Catholic Church a few miles away in Highland, Indiana.50  
Undoubtedly, that is a far more appropriate place for a crucifix. 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1423 (citation omitted). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1423; Jarvis, supra note 1, at 895. 
50 Jarvis, supra note 1, at 895 (quoting Mel Schlesinger, The Crucifix in Wicker Park, 
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND. (Oct. 1994), available at http://ffrf.org/legacy/fttoday/ 
1994/oct/schlesinger.php, archived at http://perma.cc/94J4-H4V6). 
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IV.  SUBSEQUENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Establishment Clause no longer assures separation of church 
and state.  Government is now free to subsidize religious instruction and 
worship under the guise of private choice in directing government-
issued educational vouchers to religious schools.51  Government displays 
of religious symbols do not violate the Establishment Clause so long as 
the religious message is not dominant.52  Government is free to display 
religious symbols, as long as it is careful to disguise its real purpose and 
include sufficient non-religious content to discount the religious nature 
of the display.53  In addition, government can proliferate the display of 
religious symbols on its property by creating a limited public forum in 
which private parties are allowed to display items, including religious 
symbols.54 
It is not clear whether these more recent cases would change the 
outcome in Gonzales, given the fact the Township’s attempt to switch 
from the original religious purpose to a war memorial was only thinly 
veiled.  Recently, in Salazar v. Buono, the Court addressed a complex 
situation involving a Latin cross placed on Sunrise Rock in the Mojave 
National Preserve by private citizens in 1934 to honor American soldiers 
who fell in World War I.55  The cross that stands on federal land was 
replaced or repaired several times, “most recently in 1998 by . . . a private 
                                                 
51 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (providing the Justices’ 
observations of private and public education choices with respect to religion); see also 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 831, 835 (2000) (discussing Chapter two aid and its benefits 
to private schools).  See generally Improving America’s School Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
382, 108 Stat. 382 (1994) (providing the codified text of Chapter two). 
52 Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–83, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a 
passive display of the Ten Commandments outside the state capitol surrounded by other 
monuments does not violate the Establishment Clause because, even though it sends dual 
messages, religious and secular, the secular message predominates), with McCreary Cnty. 
v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850, 869, 881 (2005) (finding that display of the Ten 
Commandments on the walls in two county courthouses violated the Establishment Clause 
because the displays lacked a secular purpose). 
53 Compare Perry, 545 U.S. at 691–92 (“Texas has treated its Capital grounds monuments 
as representing the several strands in the State’s political history and legal history.  The 
inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, 
partaking of both religion and government.”), with McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 869 (“The 
reasonable observer could only think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate 
the Commandments’ religious meaning.”). 
54 See, e.g., Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758, 770 (1995) 
(determining that preventing the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a large Latin cross in the park 
across from the Ohio statehouse violated the Klan’s freedom of speech and allowing it 
would not violate the Establishment Clause). 
55 Salazar v. Buono, 599 U.S. 700, 705–06 (2010). 
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citizen who owns land elsewhere in the Preserve.”56  The plaintiff, a 
retired Park Service employee who regularly visits the Preserve, 
obtained an injunction requiring removal of the cross.57  Beginning 
before Buono I was filed, Congress entered the fray, passing several 
statutes “forbidding the use of federal funds to remove the cross,” 
designating the cross and the adjoining land “as a national memorial 
commemorating United States participation in World War I and 
honoring the American veterans of that war,” again prohibiting the use 
of federal “funds to remove the cross,” and finally directing the Secretary 
of the Interior “to transfer to the [Veterans of Foreign Wars] the 
Government’s interest in the land that had been designated a national 
memorial” in exchange for land elsewhere in the Preserve.58  After the 
permanent injunction issued in Buono I was affirmed, “Buono returned 
to the District Court seeking to prevent the land transfer,” and the 
district court “concluded that the transfer was an attempt by the 
Government to keep the cross atop Sunrise Rock and so was invalid.”59  
Therefore, it enjoined the government from implementing the land-
transfer statute.60  This injunction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, but 
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded without a majority opinion.61  
This case provides little guidance, although it is quite apparent that five 
Justices favor implementation of the federal statute transferring the land 
on which the Latin cross stands to a private party.62  So, after at least four 
                                                 
56 Id. at 707. 
57 See Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granting 
plaintiff’s petition that challenged the constitutionality of National Park Services 
preservation of a cross). 
58 Salazar, 599 U.S. 700, 709–10.  These statutes were passed between 2001 and 2004.  Id. 
59 See id. at 710 (describing the result in Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 
2005)). 
60 See Buono, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (granting Buono’s request to enforce the permanent 
injunction). 
61 Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
rev’d, 599 U.S. 700, 722.  In Salazar, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for a plurality, joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  Salazar, 599 U.S. at 705.  Justices Roberts and 
Alito each wrote a concurring opinion, with the latter indicating the remand should be 
with instructions to vacate the injunction.  Id. at 728 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 705–29 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, 
concluding that Buono lacks standing to challenge the federal transfer statute.  Id. at 729–35 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, concluding the permanent injunction issued by the district court, 
preventing the land transfer, was a proper exercise of its authority to enforce its 2002 
judgment.  Id. at 735–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer dissented, concluding the 
“law of injunctions” controlled the case and, therefore, the writ of certiorari should have 
been dismissed as improvidently granted and absent that, the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit should be affirmed.  Id. at 1842–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
62 Salazar, 599 U.S. at 722–23. 
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decisions in the lower federal courts, a decision of the Supreme Court 
with six opinions, and four Acts of Congress, the Latin cross still stands 
on a small chunk of privately owned land in the midst of 25,000 square 
miles comprising the Preserve.63 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The history of the Wicker Park crucifix, including more than ten 
years of litigation, as presented by Professor Jarvis, provides a good 
example of the controversy that can arise when government decides to 
get in the business of displaying religious symbols.  All of the 
controversy surrounding the Wicker Park crucifix, as well as other 
government displays of religious symbols, could be avoided easily if 
governmental units at all levels simply stay out of that business.  There is 
no evidence suggesting that displaying religious symbols improves any 
unit of government.  There is plenty of evidence that such displays 
generate controversy and result in costly litigation.64  If government is 
truly interested in honoring our soldiers, there are many ways to do so 
without the use of religious symbols.65  Instead of simply determining 
that government’s display of religious symbols violates the 
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court’s decisions invite government 
to continue the unnecessary practice and thereby promote strife and 
controversy over religion.  Separation of religion and government was, 
and still is, a good idea. 
                                                 
63 See Venturi, Mojave Cross Resurrected at Preserve’s Sunrise Rock, SAN BERNARDINO CNTY. 
SENTINEL (Dec. 31, 2012), http://sbsentinel.com/2012/12/mojave-cross-resurrected-at-
preserves-sunrise-rock, archived at http://perma.cc/8C8D-FYJ9 (“The Mojave Cross has 
been re-erected at Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve, where it stood for [sixty-
seven] years to honor those American Soldiers slain in what was once known as the Great 
War, now referred to as World War I.”) 
64 Salazar, 599 U.S. at 729, 735.  In his concurring opinion in Salazar, Justice Scalia says 
that “[k]eeping within the bounds of our constitutional authority often comes at a cost.  
Here, the litigants have lost considerable time and money disputing the merits, and we are 
forced to forgo an opportunity to clarify the law.”  Id. 
65 Id.  Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Salazar says “[m]aking a plain, 
unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular.  It makes the war 
memorial sectarian.”  Id. at 735, 747.  Justice Stevens noted that he “would consider it tragic 
if the Nation’s fallen veterans were to be forgotten but there are countless different ways, 
consistent with the Constitution, that such an outcome may be averted.”  Id. at 748–49 n.8 
(internal citations omitted). 
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